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Abstract: Market power on each side of a multisided platform, whether in the form of increasing
prices or decreasing quality, is constrained by the risk of losing sales on the other sides. That tends
to weaken market power on each side and encourages platforms to keep prices lower and quality
higher than they would absent these feedback effects. In some cases the nature of the business
model, and competition, result in the platform allowing one type of customers to participate in the
platform for free or even to subsidize their participation. Non-price methods of attracting customers
are especially important in this case, particularly when the business model adopted by the industry
makes it difficult for platforms to move from free participation. To provide a reliable assessment of
competitive constraints, market power analysis must consider the interdependencies in demand by
the participants on the platform as well as have heightened focus on non-price competition when
the participation for one group is free. Market shares should be used cautiously in assessing market
power for multi-sided platforms, especially when they reflect only one side of the platform, and
therefore do not account for the interdependent customer groups, or concern a free platform side
where there is no monetary measure of value. Finally, dynamic competition makes the analysis of
market power complex because it results in feature competition, and potentially drastic innovation,
on one side of a platform that has feedback effects on the other side of the platform. The courts and
authorities have recognized these points in Qihoo 360 v. Tencent, Cartes Bancaires v. European Commission,
the Facebook/WhatsApp merger, and the Microsoft/Skype merger. These principals should become
part of the standard analysis of multi-sided platforms by courts and competition authorities globally.
These concerns are illustrated in the context of multi-sided platforms that offer online services
where free services and dynamic competition are especially important.
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I.

Introduction and Summary

Many online businesses operate multi-sided platforms that help different types of
participants get together and enter into value-increasing exchanges. Facebook, for example, makes it
possible for friends, businesses, advertisers, and developers to interact with each other. This
business model has ancient roots going back at least as far as the village matchmaker. Many
traditional businesses, such as newspapers and shopping malls, use this model. New technologies,
particularly mobile and the cloud, however, have turbocharged the multi-sided platform business
model. Online platform businesses are forming at a rapid clip and disrupting not only traditional
industries but relatively new ones as well.1
Online multi-sided platforms pose a challenge for competition policy analysis. Some have
become large national or global enterprises quickly. Competition authorities are, quite properly,
vigilant about making sure that these successful firms adhere to sound competition-law principles.
In making economically reliable assessments, however, competition authorities, as well as courts,
should account for three features of these online platforms set them apart from many other
businesses in evaluating the market power held by these platforms.
First, the demands by the different groups of participants served by multi-sided platforms
are interdependent. As a simple mathematical matter, that interdependency renders standard

See David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Matchmakers: The New Economics of Multisided Platforms (Boston, MA:
Harvard Business School Press, 2016) Available at Matchmakers.
2 See David S. Evans, “The Consensus among Economists on Multisided Platforms and Its Implications for Excluding
Evidence That Ignores It,” Competition Policy International, April 13, 2013. Available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2249817 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2249817
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formulas wrong at least without significant modifications.2 In particular, a price increase, or quality
decrease, to one group of participants reduces the demand not only by that group but also by the
other groups who then have fewer participants with which to interact. That does not mean that an
online platform could not have market power, only that the analysis needs to consider these
interdependencies and the resulting feedback effects.
Second, many online businesses make the platform “free” to one group of participants, or
even subsidize those participants, and earn profits from the other groups of participants who they
do charge.3 Although the basic concepts of competition policy analysis apply to free prices, many of
the traditional tools used for competition policy analysis, such as the SSNIP test, do not work,
without significant modification, as a straightforward mathematical matter. Most importantly,
though, the existence of a group of customers who are served for free highlights the importance of
considering the other interdependent sides in assessing market power. The platform is ordinarily
making participation “free” for a group because that group is very important for attracting paid
participants. Anything that deters “free” users from participating—such as a decrease in quality—
also reduces the incentives for the paid users, who generate all the profits, from participating as well.
Third, online platforms often engage in constant incremental innovation as they seek to
obtain advantages over rivals to attract participants on multiple sides and are subject to episodic, but
increasingly frequent, disruptive innovation in which new, or seemingly different, firms attract their
customers away. This dynamic competition is particularly important for “attention” platforms for
which competition is designed to attract the attention of users, which is then resold to marketers,
See David S. Evans, “The Consensus among Economists on Multisided Platforms and Its Implications for Excluding
Evidence That Ignores It,” Competition Policy International, April 13, 2013. Available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2249817 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2249817
3
See Evans and Schmalensee, Matchmakers, Table 2.1, and the detailed discussion in Chapter 7.
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including advertisers, who want to persuade those users to buy things. An attention seeker is under
constant threat that someone will come up with an entirely clever new way to grab people’s
attention. For competition policy analysis, this means that market power analysis needs to consider
the constraints imposed by dynamic competition and in new products and services that may appear
very different than the firm under investigation.
Courts and competition authorities have come to recognize these points as they have had the
chance to analyze online platforms and absorb the teachings of the new economic literature on
multi-sided platforms. Although it did not involve online businesses, the European Court of Justice
recognized that the analysis of competitive effects, and therefore implicitly the exercise of market
power, needed to consider the linkages between the separate sides of multi-sided platforms.4 The
Chinese Supreme People’s Court concluded that dynamic competition among platform businesses,
including one seeking and selling attention, limited market power.5 Antitrust regulators, including
those in the European Union and United States, approved Microsoft’s acquisition of Skype and
Facebook’s acquisition of WhatsApp in because they recognized how fluid market boundaries and
dynamic competition would discipline the market power of the merged entities.6
None of these judgments or decisions in any way suggests that competition authorities
Groupement des cartes bancaires v European Commission, Judgement of the Court, September 11, 2014, available at:
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf;jsessionid=9ea7d0f130d57c17cb5e4cdc4d5f8196c74dd814db12.e3
4KaxiLc3eQc40LaxqMbN4Oc3iSe0?text=&docid=157516&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&
part=1&cid=293160; Federic Pradelles and Andreas Scordamaglia-Tousis, “The Two Sides of the Cartes Bancaires
Ruling: Assessment of the Two-Sided Nature of Card Payment Systems Under Article 101(1) TFEU and Full Judicial
Scrutiny of Underlying Economic Analysis,” Competition Policy International Journal, Autumn 2014, Volume 10 Number 2.
5 David Evans and Vanessa Zhang, “Quhoo 360 v Tencent: First Antitrust Decision by the Supreme Court,” October
21, 2014, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/qihoo-360-v-tencent-first-antitrust-decision-by-thesupreme-court.
6 Case No Comp/M.6281 - Microsoft/Skype, Office of the Publications of the European Union, July 20, 2011,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6281_924_2.pdf and Case No COMP/M.7217 –
Facebook/WhatsApp, Office of the Publications of the European Union, March 10, 2014,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf.
4
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should let their guard down when it comes to online platforms. Taken together, however, with the
new economics of multi-sided platforms, and the growing body of evidence on the dynamics of
online competition over the last two-decades, these judgments and decisions do indicate that courts
and competition authorities should exercise caution, and adjust their tools, in analyzing market
power for online platforms.
This paper describes the new economics of multi-sided platforms in Section II. Then it
shows in Section III how new technologies have turbocharged this business model and led to online
mobile platforms anchored by websites and mobile apps. Section IV examines the implications of
the online multi-sided platform business model for the analysis of market power for attention
seekers. Section V offers some concluding observations.

II.

The New Economics of Multi-Sided Platforms

Although multi-sided platforms have ancient roots economists came to understand them as
an important, and distinct type of businesses in 2000 when a now classic paper by Rochet and Tirole
began circulating.7 Soon after, economists began exploring the implications of the new economics
of multi-sided platforms for antitrust issues.8 As this work has become mainstream, courts and
competition authorities have gradually absorbed the new learning and applied it to cases.

Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole (2001) "Platform Competition in Two Sided Markets," Working Paper, November
26, 2001. An earlier version was in circulation in 2000.
8 David Evans, “The Antitrust Economics of Two-Sided Markets,” Yale Journal of Regulation, Summer 2003,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=363160.
7
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A. Fundamentals of Multi-Sided Platforms
A multi-sided platform is called multi because it provides a way for two, or more, types of
participants to get together. It is called a platform because it typically operates a physical or virtual
place that enables these different types of agents to interact. Each side of the platform consists of
the participants who have the option of using the platform to connect. A shopping mall is a
physical platform. It provides a place where shoppers and stores—the participants on the two
sides—can connect. A ride-sharing app is a virtual platform. It uses cloud-based software, accessed
through Internet-connected mobile phones, to match up drivers and passengers who are the
participants on the two sides.
Multi-sided platforms typically reduce frictions that get in the way of economic agents
finding each other, interacting, and exchanging value on their own. Buyers and sellers, for example,
could find each other in a variety of ways. A marketplace, such as Flipkart in India, makes it easier
for them to find each other through, for example, posting tools for sellers and search tools for
buyers. It also makes it easier for them to engage in a transaction through the use of electronic
payment methods and with confidence through Flipkart’s Replacement Guarantees and Seller
Protection Fund.9 Multi-sided platforms also create value by increasing the odds that participants
will find counterparties that generate value for value. An online dating site, such as eHarmony,
secures many women and men thereby increasing the likelihood that people will find someone they
would like to date and perhaps even marry.

Flipkart, “Returns and Cancellations” available at http://www.flipkart.com/s/help/cancellation-returns; Flipkart,
“Seller Hub: Getting Started” available at https://seller.flipkart.com/slp/faqs.
9
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Multi-sided platforms face a chicken-and-egg problem when they start as a result of what
they are trying to accomplish. Consider a platform that is in the business of getting Type As together
with Type Bs. Type As may not want to consider the platform unless they know it has attracted
Type Bs, but Type Bs may not want to consider the platform unless they know it has attracted Type
As. The platform has to figure out a way to get both types of participants on board, in sufficient
numbers, to provide value to either. When YouTube started, for example, it had trouble persuading
people to upload videos since no one was coming to the site to watch them and trouble persuading
people to come to the site to view videos since there were few videos to watch.10
Typically, Type As value a platform if it has more Type Bs and vice versa.11 There are, in
economic terminology, positive indirect network effects and positive feedback effects. A platform
that gets more Type As becomes more attractive to more Type Bs, which in turn makes it more
attractive to more Type As, and so forth. These positive feedback effects drive platform growth.
YouTube, for example, persuaded more people to upload videos, more people came to watch those
videos, that got people more interested in uploading videos, and that in turn attracted more traffic to
the site.12
Positive indirect network effects can give bigger platforms economic advantages. These are
often limited in practice, however, by platform congestion, or other diseconomies of scale, and by
platforms differentiating themselves on one or more sides. In most countries, for example, there are
several competing payment card networks despite the positive feedback effects between cardholders

For a detailed discussion of how they solved this problem see Evans and Schmalensee, Matchmakers, Chapter 5.
As we discuss below ad-supported platforms may have positive externalities in one direction—advertising value more
viewers but viewers may not value more advertising.
12 Importantly, positive feedback effects work in reverse as we discuss below. The loss of users on one side leads to
losses of users on the other side and so on. Positive feedback effects in reverse can result in a death spiral.
10
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accepting merchants and despite scale economies in operating the network. Mobile money
platforms—where mobile phones are used to send and receive money and provide other financial
services—are evolving in the same way. More than 20 mobile wallet providers have started in
India.13 Based on the experience of countries in Africa, where the mobile money markets are more
mature, we would expect the in the long run the market will have several competing providers.14
Multi-sided platforms differ fundamentally from the traditional firms described in economic
textbooks and business school courses. Traditional firms typically buy inputs, they make products,
and they sell those products to customers. They operate along linear supply chain. And since they do
not have customers with interdependent demands they are single-sided. Multisided platforms sell
participants in each group access to the participants in each other group. As a result, the customers
are the main inputs into providing the platform service. A typical retail store, which is a single-sided
firm, buys products from wholesale distributors or manufacturers and then sells them to customers.
A shopping mall, which is a two-sided firm, recruits stores for its mall, and recruits shoppers to
come to its mall, and provides a platform where the stores get access to the shoppers and the
shoppers get access to the stores.
B. Pricing Structures and Strategies
The fact that the demand for one group depends on the demand by the other group has
interesting implications for how multisided platforms price their services. Platforms have to choose
prices that balance these demands. Higher prices for Type As would discourage them from
participating in the platform. That would deter Type Bs from participating in the platform since they
See, http://letstalkpayments.com/wallet-wars-in-india-intensifies-with-uber-and-others-being-the-battlefield/
See GSMA, State of the Industry: Mobile Financial Services for the Unbanked: 2014. Available at
http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/SOTIR_2014.pdf
13
14
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would have access to fewer Type A participants. In fact, it may make sense to price very low to one
group of participants because the other group will pay a high price for access to them. That, in fact,
is the secret behind advertising-supported media as we show below.
It could even make sense to subsidize one group by charging them a price less than the
incremental cost of serving them, including letting them use the platform for free, or even giving
them rewards for participating. Economists have shown that, as a matter of theory, platforms may
be able to maximize profits by subsidizing one side of the platform in this way and that, as matter of
fact, many platforms have do just that.15 A popular restaurant reservation site in the U.S.,
OpenTable, for example does not charge people to make reservations with its site and it gives them
rewards that they apply to reduce the cost of their meals. Although “free” is popular for online
platforms it is by no means universal. Dating sites, such as Trulymadly in India and
FarmersOnly.com in the US, charge men and women the same. They contrast with nightclubs
which, in the US, have “Ladies Night Free” pricing.
C. Advertising-Supported Platforms
Some multi-sided platforms connect consumers and advertisers. This might seem odd since
in many cases consumers do not like advertising. They even spend money to avoid it by, for
example, buying DVRs that make it easy to skip over ads and paying for alternative sources of
media, such as Pay TV, or ad-free versions of services, such as Spotify Premium.
These platforms, however, have figured out ways to connect consumers and advertisers in
ways that make both groups better off. They typically offer valuable content to persuade people
consumer to come of their platforms where these people are exposed to advertising messages.
15

See Evans and Schmalensee, Matchmakers, Table 2.1.
9

Meanwhile they persuade advertisers to pay for reaching these people. The viewers are the subsidy
side of the platform and the advertisers are the money side. So long as the advertisers are willing to
pay more for delivering messages to these consumers than the platform spends on content the
advertisers benefit, the consumers benefit, and the platform makes money.16
One can think of ad-supported platforms as buying eyeballs—usually by paying with
valuable content—and selling those eyeballs to advertisers. The Internet has made that far easier as
we see next.

III.

Online Multi-Sided Platforms

Online platforms have become more common and prominent participants in domestic
economies and some have rapidly become global players. Many of these online platforms provide
free content or services to people to attract their “attention” and then charge advertisers for
delivering messages to these people. These attention seekers engage in dynamic competition in
which they are constantly introducing new ways of attracting attention, and copying methods used
by others, to persuade people to come to their platforms. Smart mobile phones have accelerated the
pace of dynamic competition, the frequency of disruptive innovation, for online platforms.
A. The Technology Revolutions Behind Online Platforms

In fact this advertising supported media is a clever way of solving the following exchange problem. Rahul would pay
$20 to meet Aditya. Aditya doesn’t like Rahul and would pay $5 to avoid him. Still there is room for trade and an
intermediary can make Aditya and Rahul both better off. The intermediary pays Aditya $12 to meet Rahul and charges
Jose $14 for the introduction. Aditya is ahead $7 (-$5+$12), Rahul is ahead $6 ($20-$14), and intermediary earns a profit
of $2 (-$12+$14). In the case of advertising, instead of paying $14, the media property provides entertainment or other
content that Aditya values at $14.
10
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Several mutually reinforcing technologies, and the businesses the make those technologies
available, have made multi-sided platforms increasingly powerful methods for reducing frictions, and
creating valuable new services, on a global basis.
1. The PC-Web-Browser Revolution
The first wave of innovation launched the web-economy in the mid 1990s. The Internet
provided a physical network and standards for connecting computers around the world, the Web
provided a framework and software technologies for creating and linking content on those
computers, and the web browser provided an application for personal computers that enabled
people to consume Web content.
Businesses could use these technologies to provide content and services on websites. The
cost of doing so was relatively low since it involved writing software, using server computers, and
the small fees for connecting to the Internet. And the company could reach an entire country
immediately and, in fact, much of he world. Almost all the content, data, and processing work
resided in the cloud and consumers accessed it through using a browser on their Internet-connected
personal computers.
The number of web-based businesses and Internet traffic exploded following the launch of
the commercial Internet in the 1990s. A number of global online platforms emerged such as
Amazon, eBay, Facebook, Google, PayPal, and Yahoo. This growth was made possible by the
development and expansion of increasingly fast broadband delivered over fixed wires such coaxial
cable, fiber optic line, or even a copper wire.

11

2. The Mobile-App Revolution
Mobile phones were in widespread use in the U.S. and other countries by the late 1990s.
Cellular networks, however, were not able to carry enough data fast enough for people to use the
Internet from their mobile phones. Innovations in cellular technology starting in the mid 1990s
increased the potential capacity and speed of cellular networks and mobile devices for making better
use of these faster more capacious broadband technologies. Anticipating the roll out of mobile
broadband a number of companies started investing in developing various components of smart
phones, including modem and processing chips, operating systems, and handsets in the early to mid
2000s.
Innovations by Apple and Google, in particular, have led to spread of smart mobile phones
around the world, enabling billions of people to consumer Internet-based services and millions of
businesses to provide mobile-app based services to them. Apple introduced the iPhone, which
consisted of a powerful computer, a mobile operating system, and a standard set of applications
including a mobile browser in June 2007. Google invested in developing a mobile operating system,
Android, which it ran as an open-source project, and developing and organizing an ecosystem of
handset makers, mobile network operators, and other technology partners. It introduced the first
Android phone in October 2008.17 Apple and Google also stimulated the production of mobile
apps by providing software tools for developing apps for their operating systems, creating a quality
certification process for these apps, and creating “app stores” that provided centralized places for
developers to distribute apps and for users to download them on their mobile devices.

Kent German, “A Brief History of Android phones,” August 2, 2011, http://www.cnet.com/news/a-brief-history-ofandroid-phones/.
12
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Smart mobile phones changed the online game in a number of ways as they became widely
adopted, millions of apps became available for them, and faster and more capacious mobile
broadband networks were rolled out around the world. People could access the Internet anywhere
and anytime using smartphones running on mobile broadband networks. More people could do that
because mobile phones and data plans were much cheaper than buying PCs and fixed broadband
connections. Businesses could reach billions of people by developing mobile apps and distributing
them in apps stores. Apps could exploit the GPS capabilities of phones, which make it possible to
know where individuals are in physical space. This, together with the related development of the
“Internet of Things” is leading to the deep integration of the online and physical worlds.
3. The Movement from PCs/Browsers to Mobile/Apps
Businesses that want to provide online services, and consumers who want to consume
online services now have several choices. App developers can develop websites that people can visit
from browsers on their PCs or from their mobile devices. They can develop mobile apps that people
use on their mobile phones or mobile browser-apps that try to mimic these apps. Different
businesses have adopted different approaches depending on the content and services they are
providing. Consumers have, however, shifted their use dramatically from PCs to mobile devices and
from using websites to using apps.
Consider the US. Between 2008 and 2015 the proportion of time spent online using mobile
devices increased from 12.7 percent to 54.6 percent. Commerce has moved dramatically from PCs
to mobile. Americans made 57 percent of their online purchases from mobile devices in 2014

13

compared with likely none before 2010.18 On Thanksgiving Day, November 26, 2015, around 60
percent of US website visits were made from mobile devices in the US.19 Advertising has moved to
mobile in response. Facebook earned 78 percent of its global advertising revenue from mobile in
2015Q320 compared with 14 percent in 2012Q3.21 These trends are expected to continue.22
On mobile devices people typically access Internet-based services using mobile apps rather
than using websites with their mobile browser. Mobile apps accounted for nearly 90 percent of the
time Americans spend using mobile apps or browsers on their mobile devices.23 As a result the
proportion of time people spend online using mobile apps has increased from what was likely a very
low level in 2008 to 54 percent in 2015.24 This share is likely to increase further as the shift from PCs
to mobile continues and as the shift from browser-based to mobile app-based delivery continues.25
Many countries have had low penetration of PCs and fixed broadband because of their early
stages of economic development. The adoption of smart mobile phone and mobile broadband are
increasing rapidly in those countries because it is cheaper and even more rapidly in the faster
David Murphy, “IBM: Christmas Day Sales Up 8.3 Percent, Mobile Purchases up 20.4 Percent,” PC Magazine,
December 26, 2014, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2474217,00.asp.
19 Hiroko Tabuchi, “Black Friday Shopping Shifts Online as Stores See Less Foot Traffic,” New York Times, November
27, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/28/business/black-friday-shopping-shifts-online-as-stores-see-less-foottraffic.html?_r=0.
20 Facebook Inc., “10-Q for Period Ending September 30, 2015,” p. 40.
21 Facebook Inc., “10-Q for Period Ending September 30, 2012,” p. 27.
22 Chantal Tode, “M-Commerce Sales to Reach $142B in 2016: Forrester,” Mobile Commerce Daily, October 8, 2015,
http://www.mobilecommercedaily.com/mcommerce-sales-to-reach-142b-in-2016-forrester; Matthew Hobbs, “Internet
Advertising,” 2015, http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/industries/entertainment-media/outlook/segment-insights/internetadvertising.html.
23 Simon Khalaf, “Seven Years into the Mobile Revolution: Content is King … Again,” Flurry Insights, August 26, 2015,
http://flurrymobile.tumblr.com/post/127638842745/seven-years-into-the-mobile-revolution-content-is;
https://www.comscore.com/Insights/Presentations-and-Whitepapers/2015/The-2015-US-Mobile-App-Report.
24 comScore, “The 2015 U.S. Mobile App Report,” September 22, 2015,
https://www.comscore.com/Insights/Presentations-and-Whitepapers/2015/The-2015-US-Mobile-App-Report.
25Total time spent on digital media using mobile apps increased at a compound annual growth rate of 38 percent per
year between 2013 and 2015, compared to 7 percent for desktops and 24 percent for mobile browsing. The share for
mobile apps increased from 43 percent to 54 percent over this period, an increase of 11 percentage points, or a
compound annual growth rate of 12 percent. Data are not available back to 2008.
14
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growing ones. More than 90 percent of Facebook's Indian users26 and 60 percent of Amazon’s
Indian users27 access it through mobile devices. In 2014, leading Indian e-commerce companies,
including Flipkart and Snapdeal, derived the majority of their gross merchandise value from mobile
devices.28
B. Overview of Online Multi-Sided Platforms
The development of online technologies has made it cheaper and easier to reduce frictions
through multi-sided platforms and to do so over large geographic areas. The Internet makes it
possible to connect participants over wide geographic areas and in principle from around the world.
Software programs running on high-speed computers in the cloud provide powerful technologies
for finding good matches and consummating exchanges. Mobile has extended these capabilities
throughout the day and throughout physical space.
Almost immediately after web commerce became viable in the mid 1990s entrepreneurs
started using the new technologies to start multi-sided platforms. Not everyone chose a multi-sided
model. Amazon, for example, started with a typical retail model in which it bought products, initially
books, wholesale and sold them to people through its online store. Many, though, used a multisided approach often because it was the only way to provide the product or service. eBay started an
online marketplace for buyers and sellers, match.com started an online matchmaker for men and

26

BGR, “90% of Facebook’s 132 million users from India come from mobile phones,” September 27, 2015, available at
http://www.bgr.in/news/90-of-facebooks-132-million-users-from-india-come-from-mobile-phones/
27
Ashwini Gangal, “’Over 60 per cent of our traffic comes through mobile’: Manish Kalra, Amazon India,” August 28,
2015, http://www.afaqs.com/interviews/index.html?id=469_Over-60-per-cent-of-our-traffic-comes-through-mobileManish-Kalra-Amazon-India
28 BGR, “Smartphone shopping to contribute up to 70 percent of total revenue in online shopping: Experts,” November
30, 2014, available at http://www.bgr.in/news/smartphone-shopping-to-contribute-up-to-70-percent-of-total-revenuein-online-shopping-experts/.
15

women, and Yahoo started a online portal that used content to attract viewers and then attracted
advertisers who wanted to reach those views.
Many of the established platforms followed the shift from the PC-browser-centric model to
the mobile-app centric model. Entrepreneurs, however, discovered that the mobile-app centric
model provided new opportunities. Uber, for example, has built a business that connects drivers
and riders in real-time and in physical space using mobile apps.
Tables 1 and 2 provide an overview of online multi-sided platforms based on their presence
in the US, which reflects global platforms, and India, which reflects domestic platforms and global
ones. In each country we have selected 20 platforms. We include the largest ones based on the
number of times over the space of a month people clicked on pages on those sites (“pageviews”).
That is a particularly useful measure for content-oriented sites. We have erred on the side of
showing diversity of online platforms and the table is not intended to be an accurate summary of the
economically most important online platforms. In each case we summarize the multi-sided business
model and the extent to which one side receives service for free.
As these tables show online platforms are highly diverse. However, they often have several
of the following features that are relevant for antitrust analysis. First, they are all based on software.
They can add new features, and introduce new products and services, by modifying or adding
software code and related databases. That is much different than physical platforms. Second, the
marginal cost of participants to software-based platforms running in the cloud is virtually zero. That
increases the normal tendency of multi-sided platforms to allow a group of participants to use the
platform for free. Third, dynamic competition is more intense for online platforms because
technological change has reduced the capital cost of starting a platform and the software-based
16

nature of these platforms makes it easier for platforms to offer new products and services in
competition with other platforms.29 Fourth, dynamic competition is also more intense for online
platforms because the participants have lower switching costs, and face less lock-in, than on physical
platforms where they often have to make costly sunk-cost commitments to the platform. Fifth,
online platforms are in the midst of a massive technological shift resulting from the move of
consumers from the PC-browser to the mobile-app centric way of using online services.30 These
points are especially true one of the largest categories on online platforms.

Case No Comp/M.6281 - Microsoft/Skype, Office of the Publications of the European Union, July 20, 2011,
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6281_924_2.pdf ; “FTC Notifies Facebook, WhatsApp of
Privacy Obligations in Light of Proposed Acquisition,” Federal Trade Commission, April 10, 2014,
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/04/ftc-notifies-facebook-whatsapp-privacy-obligations-lightproposed; and Case No COMP/M.7217 – Facebook/WhatsApp, Office of the Publications of the European Union, March
10, 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m7217_20141003_20310_3962132_EN.pdf.
30 See Hemant Bhargava, David S. Evans, and Deepa Mani, “The Move to Smart Mobile and its Implications for
Antitrust Analysis of Online Market In Developed and Developing Countries,” Forthcoming.
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Table 1: Summary of Most Frequented Platforms in the US
Webpage

Category

Page Views in
November 2015

Free participants

122,298,603

People and many app developers

75,325,987
38,899,360
25,612,235

Advertisers and some app
developers
Advertisers
Advertisers
Advertisers
Sellers pay Amazon for sales and
advertising
Advertisers

Paid participants

GOOGLE.COM
YOUTUBE.COM
YAHOO.COM

Social Media - Social Networking, Social
Media
Search/Navigation
Entertainment - Multimedia, Entertainment
Portals

AMAZON.COM

Retail

11,490,679

BING.COM

9,080,541
8,964,010

Viewers and many listers of ads

Certain categories of listers for ads

MSN.COM

Search/Navigation
Directories/Resources - Classifieds,
Directories/Resources
Portals

Searchers and websites
Video uploaders and viewers
Viewers
Buyers do not pay Amazon
MarketPlace
Searchers and websites

8,483,598

Viewers

EBAY.COM

Retail

6,197,320

Buyers do not pay eBay

5,363,234
3,492,807
3,131,420

Viewers
None
People

2,722,905

People for basic service

Advertisers
Sellers pay eBay for sales and
advertising
Advertisers
Viewers pay and advertisers pay
Advertisers/marketers
Advertisers and people for
premium service

2,043,564

Receivers of funds

Senders of funds

1,966,864

People do not pay Groupon

Groupon is paid by businesses for
marketing and advertising services

1,892,345

Uploaders of pictures and viewers
of them

Advertisers

1,881,808

People looking for information

Advertisers

1,675,644

People who send and read tweets

Advertisers

1,406,674

People looking for jobs

Employers advertising jobs

1,362,865

Viewers

Advertisers

FACEBOOK.COM

CRAIGSLIST.ORG

AOL.COM
Portals
ESPN.COM
Sports
SWAGBUCKS.COM Services - Coupons, Services
Social Media - Social Networking, Social
LINKEDIN.COM
Media
Business/Finance - Personal Finance,
PAYPAL.COM
Business/Finance
GROUPON.COM
IMGUR.COM
ANSWERS.COM
TWITTER.COM
INDEED.COM
CNN.COM

Services - Coupons, Services
Social Media
Directories/Resources - Reference,
Directories/Resources
Social Media - Social Networking, Social
Media
Career Services and Development - Career
Resources, Career Services and
Development
News/Information - General News,
News/Information

Source: comScore
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Table 2: Summary of Most Frequented Platforms in India
Company
Google.com

Youtube.com

Category
Search/Navigation
Social Media - Social Networking, Social
Media
Entertainment - Multimedia, Entertainment

Amazon.com

Retail

Yahoo.com

Portals

Flipkart.com

Retail

Facebook.com

Indiatimes.com
Linkedin.com
Twitter.com

News/Information - General News,
News/Information
Social Media - Social Networking, Social
Media
Social Media - Social Networking, Social
Media

Snapdeal.com

Retail

Stackoverflow.com

Q&A Website

Ebay.in

Retail

Ndtv.com

News/Information - General News,
News/Information

Jabong.com

Retail

Free participants
Searchers and websites

Paid participants
Advertisers

People and many app developers

Advertisers and some app developers

Video uploaders and viewers
Buyers do not pay Amazon
MarketPlace
Viewers
Buyers do not pay Flipkart
MarketPlace

Advertisers
Sellers pay Amazon for sales and
advertising
Advertisers
Sellers pay Flipkart for sales and
advertising

Viewers

Advertisers

People for basic service

Advertisers and people for premium
service

People who send and read tweets

Advertisers

Buyers do not pay Snapdeal
MarketPlace
People looking for information
related to computer programming

Sellers pay Snapdeal for sales and
advertising

Buyers do not pay eBay

Sellers pay eBay for sales and
advertising

Viewers

Advertisers

Rediff.com
Quikr.com

Buyers do not pay Jabong
MarketPlace
Portals
Viewers
Directories/Resources - Classifieds, Directories/Resources
Viewers and many listers of ads

Naukri.com

Employment Recruiting

imdb.com

Social Media - Social Networking, Social
Media
Entertainment - Movies, Entertainment

shopclues.com

Retail

Pinterest.com

Advertisers

People for basic service

Sellers pay Jabong for sales and
advertising
Advertisers
Certain categories of listers for ads
Advertisers and people for premium
service

Viewers

Advertisers

Viewers
Buyers do not pay Shopclues
MarketPlace

Advertisers
Sellers pay Shopclues for sales and
advertising

Source: http://www.alexa.com/
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C. Online Attention Seekers
At is has turned out many online platforms make money primarily by helping businesses sell
things to consumers through advertising and marketing.31 As we discussed above the way they do
this is simple but clever. They provide reasons to consumers to come visit them by offering
engaging content or services valued by consumers. Consumers typically do not pay for obtaining
the content or services. They are free in that sense. But consumers are receiving value by coming to
these platforms. In that sense the real price of participating in the platform is even better than free, it
is negative, so that platform is paying consumers to come visit. Once they have gotten consumers
to spend time of the platform they allow businesses to present advertising or other marketing
messages to consumers. They charge businesses for this and that is how they cover their costs and
make profits.
Online attention seekers compete to get the attention of consumers and then sell portions of
that attention to businesses that aren’t able to get it easily on their own. They seldom make any
money directly from providing content or services to consumers. Recognizing this is important for
understanding the dynamics of competition. Entrepreneurs compete to come up with clever ideas
for attracting eyeballs—say by inventing tweeting or pinning—not so they can charge people for
clever content or services they are providing but so they can sell access to those eyeballs to
advertisers. Attention seekers may come up with ways to differentiate themselves from the
standpoint of attracting consumer attention and selling advertising. But overall they are competing
to attract a limited pool of attention and advertising and marketing budgets to reach those
consumers. Now consider the five features that we highlighted above.
31

David Evans, “Attention Rivalry Among Online Platforms,” Journal of Competition Law & Economics, May 14, 2013,
Volume 9 Issue 2:313-357, http://jcle.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/2/313.abstract.
20

Attention seekers are all built on software platforms. They do not have printing presses,
cable networks, or radio towers. When they want to add features to the platforms they hire software
engineers to write code. They can often make changes quickly and roll those changes out globally. It
took about 5 months, for example, for Facebook to develop Facebook Messenger which is one of
the leading apps for smartphones.32
The marginal cost of another participant on an attention seeker is essentially zero. Google
does not incur any significant out of pocket cost when a person conducts another search or when it
puts another search ad on a search results page. That is true for virtually all attention seekers with
the exception of some, such as Pandora, that have to pay for the content they deliver.
The capital cost of starting an attention seeker is low and that has intensified dynamic
competition. That is more so true now as a result of mobile apps. The founders of WhatsApp had
to write software code so that messaging app would work for Apple and Android phones and for
the cloud-based service those apps were connected with.33 Once they did that they had a platform
that could provide messaging services globally to unlimited number of users with the addition of
some cheap server capacity. Many other mobile messaging apps have started. They compete with
older messaging PC-based messaging apps as well as the new mobile-based ones.
It is easy for consumers to reduce the amount of attention they provide one platform, or
drop it altogether, and increase the amount of attention they provide another platform. Since the
platforms are free they can use as many as they want and switch their attention depending upon the
Facebook, “Building Facebook Messenger,” August 12, 2011, available at
https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook-engineering/building-facebook-messenger/10150259350998920/.
33 One estimate is that it would cost about $250,000 and take about nine months to build a robust version of an app like
WhatsApp. See Courtney Boyd Myers, “How much does it cost to build the world’s hottest startups?” TNW News,
December 2, 2013. Available at http://thenextweb.com/dd/2013/12/02/much-cost-build-worlds-hotteststartups/#gref
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relative attractiveness to spending time on one or the other. The consumer bears no cost from
shifting time from looking at Yahoo to looking at Flipboard. While some online platforms involve
some cost of switching in practice it does not limit people from doing so. In the case of social
networks, Americans switched from Friendster to MySpace and then from MySpace to Facebook.34
People in other countries, such as Brazil and India, switched from Orkut to Facebook.35
Finally, the shift of consumers from looking at websites with their browsers to using apps
on their mobile phones has resulted in dramatic changes in attention seeking platforms. There has
been a dramatic increase in the amount of online attention available as a result of people being able
to go online with their mobile devices for much more of the day. The opportunities for connecting
businesses with consumers have also changed now that people carry mobile phones all the time and
in particular when they go shopping. Search is one of the attention-seeking businesses that is
undergoing disruption as a result of this.36 Search engines index websites and allow people to find
things on those websites. But now an enormous amount of online activity is happening with mobile
apps. At this point it is unclear how people will be able to find app-based content and what
companies will ultimately succeed in doing so. Apple, Facebook, and Google are among the
companies that are trying to figure this out.37
What’s should be clear from the discussion so far is that multi-sided platforms are governed
by different rules than traditional linear businesses and that competition among online platforms is

Evans and Schmalensee, Matchmakers, Chapter 9.
Elena Trost, Social Media Marketing in BRIC Countries (Zurich, Lit Verlag GmbH & Co., 2013), Chapter 3.
36 Erin Griffith, “Facebook, Google and the battle for mobile intent,” September 8, 2015, available at
http://fortune.com/2015/09/08/facebook-google-mobile-search-advertising/
37 Erin Griffith, “Facebook, Google and the battle for mobile intent,” September 8, 2015, available at
http://fortune.com/2015/09/08/facebook-google-mobile-search-advertising/
34
35

22

often more intense and more dynamic than among physical platforms. Both point have important
implications for antirust analysis.

IV.

Market Power Analysis of Online Attention Seekers

Economists typically assume that the demand for a product depends on the price of that
product, the price of substitute products, and the price of complementary products. The demand for
a particular brand of beer, for example, depends on the price of that brand, the prices of other kinds
of beer and other alcoholic beverages, and perhaps the demand for nuts, chips, and other things that
people eat with beer. Most economic theories relied on in antitrust analysis, such as those involving
predatory pricing, and economic tools, such as SSNIP tests, are based on this model of product
demand.
All of those factors are relevant for considering the demand for product and services
provided by multi-sided platforms. But those standard factors do not include the most critical factor
that drives the demand for platforms. The demand by members of one group of customers, say
Type A, depends, roughly speaking, on the participation of the other group of customers, say Type
B, in the platform.38 To avoid being mathematically wrong and unreliable, economic models and
tools must account for the interdependent demand and consider all sides of the platforms. The fact
that the demands by the various groups of platform participants are interdependent also means that

More precisely, platform customers care about the likelihood that they will be able to enter into valuable exchange on
the platform; we are using the number of potential trading partners as a short-hand for describing all of the
characteristics of one side of the platform that affects the demand by the other side.
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analyses that focus on one group of participants in isolation are not correct as a straightforward
mathematical matter.39
Antitrust analysis needs to examine the platform overall taking these interdependencies into
account.40 Generally, that requires treating the platform as a whole, rather than focusing on one
group of customers or another, or at least carefully considering the inter-linkages between these
groups. Platform competition tends to force overall prices down and reduces the profits the
platform can earn. Typically, though, it does not force prices down to incremental costs for all, or
even any, sides of the platform. Even with competition platforms may choose to subsidize one side
of the platform and make profits for other sides of the platform.
The magazine business, for example, is highly competitive yet most magazines subsidize
readers; the cover price for the magazine often does not cover printing and distribution costs let
along the cost of the content that attracts readers. In fact, competition to attract participants to the
platform can result in greater subsidies to one side. For example, in the U.S., competition among
payment card networks apparently resulted in bidding up payments (called interchange fees) to

David Evans and Richard Schmalensee, “The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses,” January 30,
2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2185373; Roger Blair and Daniel Sokol, eds., Oxford
Handbook on International Antitrust Economics, Oxford University Press, 2015; University of Chicago Institute for
Law & Economics Olin Research Paper No. 623. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2185373; David Evans,
“The Consensus Among Economists on Multisided Platforms and its Implications for Excluding Evidence that Ignores
It,” Competition Policy International, (April 13, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2249817 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2249817.
40 In Cartes Bancaires v. European Commission, the European Court of Justice concluded that to analyze competitive
effects it was necessary to consider the two interlinked sides of the platform. See Groupement des cartes bancaires v
European Commission, Judgement of the Court, September 11, 2014. In, Qihoo 360 v. Tencent, the Chinese Supreme
People’s Court found that it was necessary to consider platform competition in evaluating market power. See, David
Evans and Vanessa Zhang, “Quhoo 360 v Tencent: First Antitrust Decision by the Supreme Court,” October 21, 2014,
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/qihoo-360-v-tencent-first-antitrust-decision-by-the-supreme-court;
Charles Rivers Associates, “Qihoo v. Tencent: economic analysis of the first Chinese Supreme
Court decision under Anti-Monopoly Law” February 2015, available at
http://www.crai.com/sites/default/files/publications/China-Highlights-Qihoo-360-v-Tencent-0215_0.pdf
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banks that issue cards to consumers.41 As a result, evidence that price is great than incremental cost
on one side provides no meaningful evidence that the platform has market power and evidence that
the platform charges a price less than marginal cost on another side provides no meaningful
evidence that the platform is engaging in predatory pricing. The analyst needs to look at the
platform overall to assess market power and predation. In practice, it often makes sense to look at
pricing and competition on both sides but then accounting for the interdependencies.
This section applies these general principles to the analysis of market power for online
attention seekers which is one of the most important categories of online platforms.

A. Free and Feature Competition
Traditional antitrust analysis assesses market power by considering whether the firm can
increase price profitably. That approach does not make any economic or business sense for online
attention seekers. The business is based on paying consumers to use the platform and charging
advertisers for access to those consumers. An exercise of market power over consumers would
could involve increasing the price to them but, more likely, would involve reducing the quality of the
content and services the platform is providing to attract their attention.42 Whether that reduction in
quality is profitable depends on the extent to which it would decrease the attractiveness of the
platform to advertisers. A platform could consider reducing its expenditures on quality
improvements by $1 million. Whether this is profitable depends on whether the lower quality would
reduce the amount of advertising, given the lower attention it attracts, by less than $1 million.
OECD, “Competition and Payment Systems,” June 28, 2013,
http://www.oecd.org/competition/PaymentSystems2012.pdf.
42 The decision by online attention seekers to charge fees is quite rare even for ones that are highly successful. Some
online newspapers have tried paywalls with mixed success.
41
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This highlights the importance of feature and quality competition. Online attention seekers
do not compete based on price. Therefore, to assess market power, one needs to assess the extent to
which a lower provision of quality would divert attention to other online platforms. In considering
that diversion there is no business or economic reason to limit the inquiry to online platforms that
provide the same service. It is an empirical question whether consumers would turn their attention
to completely different services.
In practice market power analysis for online attention seekers can consider substitution
possibilities by considering a small but significant increase in price or a small but significant decrease
in quality. Either one reduces the value of the platform for users and could induce switching. The
SSNIP, however, must consider small absolute increase in price since a percentage increase is
undefined when the initial price is zero. The Chinese Supreme People’s Court, in Qihoo 360 v.
Tencent, decided that the SSNIP evidence was not relevant and considered informally how consumers
would react to small but significant decreases in quality (SSNDQ) of the instant message products
under consideration.43
Since attention makers make virtually all of the revenue and profit from advertisers the other
issue concerning market power is whether they can take actions that increase the price of advertising
above competitive level. The analysis of that question needs to consider the extent to which
advertisers can get the attention of consumers in other ways and the extent to which the online
platform offers some consumer attention, perhaps based on demographic profiles or the context in
which they’ve captured that attention, for which there are limited substitutes.
See, David Evans and Vanessa Zhang, “Quhoo 360 v Tencent: First Antitrust Decision by the Supreme Court,”
October 21, 2014, https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/qihoo-360-v-tencent-first-antitrust-decision-bythe-supreme-court.
43
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Free pricing, however, shouldn’t be analyzed in isolation. In fact, the existence of consumers
being offered something for nothing is almost always an indication that the business is a multi-sided
platform. That means that the demand by consumers on the “paid side” is linked to the demand by
consumers on the “free side” to the demand. The SSNIP and SSDNQ analyses should account for
the interdependencies of demand for taking a holistic approach, and considering the platform
overall, or by carefully considering the linkages in demand and their implications for competitive
constraints.
B. New Entry, Cross-Category Entry, and Feature Competition
Market power analysis needs to consider the ease of entry and of feature competition for
online attention seekers. As discussed above the capital cost of entry for online attention seekers is
low. The main difficulty is attracting consumers to the platform with persuasive content and
services. Importantly, though, the analysis needs to at least consider the impact on the platform of
entry by completely different services. For example, suppose Facebook reduced its investment in
the quality of its social networking platform. It could lose advertising revenue in part because that
increases the likelihood that consumers will more likely to shift attention to “the next new thing”—
not necessarily to a social network—and that will cost the company advertising revenues. In
addition, market power analysis needs to consider entry from other categories. Because it is easy to
change features through software online attention seekers can add features that mimic those of other
very different attention seekers. Twitter and Pinterest, for example, have both recently introduced
“buy buttons” that help businesses make sales on their platforms, like Amazon Marketplace, in
addition to just advertising to those consumers. That feature competition is an example of dynamic
competition which we turn to next.
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C. Dynamic Competition
Dynamic competition has characterized online attention seekers for the last twenty years and
shows no signs of abating. Attention seekers have no guarantee that they can hold onto consumers
without engaging in persistent incremental feature and disruptive innovation. We see this in a variety
of ways.
First, the relative importance of attention seekers changes dramatically over time.44 Table 3
shows the 20 largest advertising-supported attention seekers by time spent on the webpage in 2002,
2007, and 2012. Pinterest (8) is a US advertising supported webpages that users spent the most time
visiting during September 2012 did not exist in September 2007, while several webpages were in the
early stages of development including Facebook (1), Youtube (2), The Huffington Post (9), and
Tumblr (10). This illustrates how quickly and dramatically the landscape for online advertising can
change.
Second, successful attention seekers have declined and in some cases failed when they have
not kept up, while new ones have risen quickly. Orkut was the dominant social networking site
between 2005 and 2010 in India.45 Facebook overtook it in July 2010.46 MySpace had a similar
experience in the US where it was the largest between 2005 and 2009 and also displaced by
Facebook.47 Yahoo was a highly successful attention seeker for many years. While it still attracts a

See David Evans, “Attention Rivalry Among Online Platforms,” Journal of Competition Law & Economics, May 14,
2013, Volume 9 Issue 2:313-357.
45 Sahil Shah, “Social Networking War in India: Facebook vs Orkut,” January 25, 2011,
https://www.techinasia.com/indian-social-networking-wars-facebook-vs-orkut-2
46 comScore, “Facebook and Orkut Growth in India,” November 4, 2010. http://www.comscore.com/Insights/DataMine/Facebook-and-Orkut-Growth-in-India
47 Pete Cashmore, “MySpace, America's Number One,” July 11, 2006, http://mashable.com/2006/07/11/myspaceamericas-number-one/#tqA37Md.SgqA; Choloe Albanesius “Home/News & Analysis/More Americans Go To
Facebook Than MySpace
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large number of pageviews the market value of the portion of advertising-supported portion of the
business is negligible according to various reports.48
Third, mobile apps have provided opportunities for the creation of new attention seekers
and have reduced the relative importance of incumbent attention seekers. Facebook, for example,
has become one of the largest online advertising platforms in the world through its success in
attracting attention of mobile device users and selling that attention to advertisers. It now provides
three of the ten mobile apps that attract the largest number of page views.49 Traditional search
advertising, while still important on mobile, is much less significant than it is on the web.
D. Market Shares as Indicia of Market Power
A number of commentators have pointed out that market shares must be used with care in
assessing market power.50 This advice is particularly sound when it comes to measuring market
power on the consumer side of online attention platforms. In traditional markets sound practice
involves measuring market shares based on value to account for quality differences between
products. It also makes sense to focus on price because it is an important dimension of
competition. Most online attention seekers do not charge consumers for using the platform. Price is

More Americans Go To Facebook Than MySpace,” June 16, 2009,
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2348822,00.asp.
48 Steven Levy, “Yahoo and Alibaba: Joined at the Balance Sheet,” March 3, 2015,
https://medium.com/backchannel/yahoo-and-alibaba-joined-at-the-balance-sheet-94b459233894#.cklylx3x3; Lawrence
Meyers, “Yahoo Stock: Is YHOO Worth Nothing Without BABA?,” September 21, 2015,
http://investorplace.com/2015/09/yahoo-stock-yhoo-baba-alibaba/#.VnNaiPkrKM8.
49 comScore, “comScore Reports July 2015 U.S. Smartphone Subscriber Market Share,” September 3, 2015
50 Louis Kaplow, “Market Definition, Market Power,” May 2015,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2605179## ; Jonathan B. Baker and Timothy F. Bresnahan,
“Economic Evidence in Antitrust: Defining Markets and Measuring Market Power,” Economic Evidence in Antitrust,
http://web.stanford.edu/~tbres/research/buccirossi_01_ch01_001-042.pdf; Howard H. Change, David S. Evans, and
Richard Schmalensee, “Assessment of the Relevant Market in Competition Matters,” March 30, 2011.
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Table 3: Top 20 US Advertising Supported Attention Seeker Websites in
September 2002, 2007, and 2012, Ranked by User Time Spent on the
Webpage
Rank
Sept-2002
-

Rank
Rank
Sept-2007 Sept-2012
1

Domain

Description

Facebook.com

Social Networking

Youtube.com

Video

-

-

2

Yahoo.com

Portal

1

1

3

Google.com

Search

3

3

4

Msn.com

Portal

2

2

5

Aol.com

Portal

4

4

6

Bing.com

Search

-

-

7

Pinterest.com

Online Pinboard

-

-

8

Huffingtonpost.com

News

-

-

9

Tumblr.com

Social Networking

-

-

10

Pandora.com

Music

-

-

11

Nfl.com

Sports

9

7

12

Cnn.com

News

14

5

13

Tagged.com

Social Networking

-

-

14

Foxnews.com

News

-

18

15

Nbcnews.com

News

-

-

16

Ask.com

Search

16

10

17

Fanfiction.net

Hobby/Interest

-

9

18

Cbssports.com

Sports

-

-

19

Mapquest.com

Maps

17

6

20

Weather.com

Weather

18

17

-

Cartoonnetwork.com

Entertainment

19

-

-

Foxsports.com

Sports

-

12

-

Nytimes.com

News

11

-

-

Mlb.com

Sports

-

13

-

About.com

Reference

-

19

-

Usatoday.com

News

-

20

-

Imdb.com

Movie Reference

-

16

-

Univision.com

Entertainment

-

15

-

Blackplanet.com

Social Networking

6

14

-

Livejournal.com

Blogging

13

-

-

Blogger.com

Blogging

-

11

-

Excite.com

Search

8

-

-

Iwon.com

Portal

10

-

-

Lycos.com

Search

5

-

-

Netscape.com

Software

7

-

-

Altavista.com

Search

20

-

-

Hotmail.com

Web Mail

-

8

-

Ezboard.com

Discussion

12

-

-

Asianavenue.com

Social Networking

15

-

-

Source: Compete.com, September 2002, September 2007, and September 2012
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therefore not available as a measure of quality differences and for that matter is not an important
element of competition relative to the content and service subsidies.
Market shares are poor indicia of market power for online attention seekers in part because
precise market boundaries are more difficult to establish. Narrow market definitions, confined to
functional substitutes for the content or services provided by the platform, seldom make sense
because consumers shift their attention fluidly among different platforms. That is not to say that a
broad definition is appropriate either since many platforms have some source of differentiation that
makes consumers more likely to give them their attention. To the extent market shares are used they
should be calculated using different plausible definitions of the relevant set of substitutes.
V.

Conclusion
Multi-sided platforms comprise an increasingly large portion of the economy, in part as a

result of the technological changes described above. Online multi-sided platforms are now behind
waves of creative destruction. Protecting competition in this part of the economy is important and
competition authorities should be commended for being vigilant in making sure that dominant
platforms do not violate the competition rules and that rent-seeking incumbents do not stand in the
way of innovative new platforms.
Antitrust analysis, however, needs to adjust the standard tools for assessing market power so
that they are accurate, as a matter of economics and mathematics, for multi-sided platforms. That
includes recognizing that important implications of interdependent demand, and interlinked sides,
for platforms. Particular care is needed to online platforms, and especially online attention seekers,
because of the importance of non-price competition, the pervasive use for zero prices, and the role,
at least for now, of intense dynamic competition.
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